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CONSTITUTIONAL AND FAMILY LAW--GRANDPARENT
VISITATION IN THE FACE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE: PARENTAL OR GRANDPARENTAL RIGHTS? Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
I. INTRODUCTION
Therefore do not imagine that the parental office is a matter ofyour
pleasure and whim.'
Many children grow up with either only one parent or even entirely
in their grandparents' homes.2 All the while, particularly in custody
disputes, grandparents have become increasingly aware of their
grandchildren's plights and their own rights, or lack thereof.' Every
state has enacted so-called grandparent visitation statutes that attempt
to enable grandparents to maintain a relationship with their grandchil-
dren, at times even against the wishes of the parents.4 However, the
United States Supreme Court recently ruled that section 26.10.160(3)
of the Revised Code of Washington' violated the United States
Constitution in that it encroached on the fundamental parental right to
determine matters of "care, custody, and control" of the children.6
This note explores the Troxel decision and finds its significance in
reaffirming parental rights in the face of a continuous fundamental
rights debate and the need to balance those rights with grandparent and
other third-party visitation. For this purpose, the note first examines the
social changes in American family life and the political sense of crisis
arising from those changes. It next surveys the history of parental rights
cases and the ongoing debate regarding the so-called substantive due
process analysis. In this context, the note illuminates the current
attempts of the United States Supreme Court to curb the often perceived
excessive substantive due process analysis of previous cases, and yet
maintain a healthy dose of fundamental rights jurisprudence. The note
further considers limitations to parental rights and the best-interest-of-
the-child standard. In conclusion, the note briefly looks to the impact of
1. THE LARGE CATECHISM OF MARTIN LuTm 32 (Robert H. Fischer trans., Fortress
Press 1959).
2. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
5. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997).
6. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000). Justice O'Connor announced the
plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer;
Justices Souter and Thomas filed concurring opinions; and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and
Kennedy dissented. Id. at 73.
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the Troxel decision on current state law, especially in Arkansas, as well
as the general significance of the case for parental rights and future
developments of third-party visitation laws.
II. FACTS
When Brad Troxel and Tommie Granville ended their relationship,
Brad moved back into his parents' home in Anacortes, Washington.7
Brad and Tommie had lived together off and on for several years until
June 1991, without ever marrying." Their two daughters, Isabelle and
Natalie,9 regularly accompanied Brad for weekend visits to the Troxel
home.'" There, they saw their paternal grandparents, Jenifer and Gary
Troxel." In May 1993, approximately two years after Brad and Tommie
had separated, Brad killed himself." For the first few months after
Brad's demise, the Troxel grandparents continued to see their grand-
daughters on a regular schedule." However, Tommie Granville started
a new relationship and family with Kelly Wynn, whom she married
during the court battle soon to ensue." In October 1993, Tommie
7. Id. at 60; see also Brief for Petitioner at 2, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000) (No. 99-138).
8. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. Apparently, Tommie and Brad had "lived together
intermittently from 1988 to 1991." Brief for Petitioner at 2, Troxel (No. 99-138).
Respondent's brief mentioned January 1989 as the starting point of the relationship.
Brief for Respondent at 8, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No. 99-138).
9. Isabelle and Natalie were eighteen months and three years old, respectively,
at the time the visitation dispute started. Profile: Supreme Court to Focus on the Rights of
Grandparents (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 12, 2000), available at 2000 WL 21478772
[hereinafter Profile]. Natalie's birthday was in November 1989, and Isabelle's in
December 1991. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Troxel (No. 99-138).
10. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. The girls spent "every other weekend" with their father,
according to a court-sanctioned parenting plan. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Troxel (No. 99-
138).
11. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. The Troxels have three children other than Brad and
eight grandchildren. Brief for Petitioner at 2 n. 1, Troxel (No. 99-13 8).
12. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
13. Id. During the first months following Brad's suicide, Tommie Granville
received help in caring for the children from Brad's siblings. Brief for Petitioner at 2,
Troxel (No. 99-138); Brief for Respondent at 8, Troxel (No. 99-138). The Troxel
grandparents visited the girls when they were in the care of Brad's siblings. Id. at 9.
14. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. Apart from Isabelle and Natalie, Tommie has three other
children by Jeff Granville and one more child by Kelly Wynn. Brief for Petitioner at
2 n.2, Troxel (No. 99-138). Kelly Wynn brought two more children from a previous
marriage into the Granville-Wynn household (bringing the total number of children to
eight). Id.
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Granville notified the grandparents,' that they were not to see the girls
more than one short time per month. 5
The Troxels reacted in December of the same year by petitioning
the Washington Superior Court for Skagit County to receive visitation
rights with their granddaughters. 6 They relied on two Washington
statutes, of which only section 26.10.160(3) of the Washington Revised
Code ultimately remained an issue in the case. 7 The Troxels demanded
"two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks of
visitation each summer."' "S They abstained from any claim that Tommie
Granville was not a fit mother.' While the mother, Tommie Granville,
did not principally object to visitation, she wished to limit the Troxels
to "one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay."20 The
dispute seemed to center on the quantity and quality of the visits rather
than anything else.2' In 1995, the Superior Court ordered visitation "one
15. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61. The increase of "spur-of-the-moment requests" to
meet the girls worried Tommie. Brief for Respondent at 9, Troxel (No. 99-138).
Tommie wanted to secure her "efforts to nurture her new blended family with Kelly
Wynn." Id. Visitation ended in October 1993 and commenced again in April 1994 due
to a temporary visitation order. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Troxel (No. 99-138). The
parties offered differing views as to the reasons why there were no visits in this time
period. See id. at 2 n.3. Tommie forbade telephone contact between the Troxels and
their granddaughters in February 1994. Id. at 3. Visitation resumed from April 1994
until the end of 1998, after which the Troxels saw Isabelle twice and Natalie only once.
Id. at 6. The parties do not agree on the reasons for this development. Id at 6 n.10.
16. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. According to Tommie, the Troxels first contacted the
state mediation service. Profile, supra note 9. Upon Tommie's response that there was
no need for mediation, she did not hear again from the Troxels until "the day before our
wedding, [when] we were served with papers." Id.
17. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997). The section read as
follows: "Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including,
but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any
person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child, whether or not there has
been any change of circumstances." Id. (emphasis added). The Washington Code now
states that the United States Supreme Court has found the entire section 26.10.160
unconstitutional in the Troxel case. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160 (West Supp. 2001).
18. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. The grandparents also asked for "reasonable time on
holidays and school vacations, especially Thanksgiving weekend, the Christmas
holidays, [and] Easter weekend." Brief for Respondent at 9, Troxel (No. 99-138).
19. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Troxel (No. 99-138).
20. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. Petitioner's brief also acknowledged that all parties
agreed that visitation was in the best interest of the children. Brief for Petitioner at 3,
Troxel (No. 99-138). However, Tommie feared that overnight stays would not be a good
idea until the girls had grown older. Id.
21. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Troxel (No. 99-138). The grandmother, Jenifer
Troxel, gave testimony that may mean more to some readers than to others: she
"understood that [Tommie] preferred that the younger girl be called Isabelle, rather than
her middle name Rose-the name that had been used by Brad--and agreed to honor
that wish." Id. Tommie also testified that there had not been any conflict with the
2001]
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weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on
both of the petitioning grandparents' birthdays."'
Tommie Granville appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals,'
particularly because the visitation included overnight stays and a
summer vacation.24 The Washington Court of Appeals remanded,
ordering the trial court to put in writing its findings of fact and
conclusions of law.2' The lower court complied, finding that the
Troxels "in the presence of the children." Id. at 3-4. An expert witness on behalf of
Tommie did not know of any differences between the Troxels and Granvilles
"regarding discipline, religion, or any other important issue affecting the girls." Id. at
4 & n.7. But the trial judge's order contained certain provisions that shed further light
on the situation: apart from the name Isabelle, the Troxels were to refrain from
commenting to the girls about the circumstances of Brad's death until Tommie had
agreed with them on a "joint explanation." Id. at 5. Neither party could freely exercise
criticism of the other before the girls. Id. Tommie expressed concern that Brad's parents
considered her daughters a "substitute" for Brad. Brief for Respondent at 10, Troxel
(No. 99-138). Indeed, Mrs. Troxel later admitted that her initial visitation requests were
"probably . . . too long," and "[i]t was too close to Brad's death." Profile, supra note
9. In her brief, Tommie also stated that especially Natalie appeared upset following
visits with the Troxels. Brief for Respondent at 10, Troxel (No. 99-138). Tommie
explained on NPR Morning Edition that, as soon as the family learned of her wedding
with Kelly Wynn, "[a]ll of a sudden the aunts and uncles started asking to see the
children, too, and it was like at least two times a week we were getting these requests,"
at a time when the girls were eighteen months and three years old. Profile, supra note
9. By the same token, Jenifer Troxel was afraid that Tommie might "cut [them] off
altogether." Id.
22. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. The trial judge acknowledged that a more extended
visitation could interfere with the need of the two girls spending time with the other
siblings in their new family. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Troxel (No. 99-138); see also supra
note 13 (discussing the blended family of the Granvilles and Wynns). The court-
approved monthly visit was to extend from 4:30 p.m. on Saturday until 6 p.m. on
Sunday. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Troxel (No. 99-138). Significantly, the trial judge
explained his decision as follows:
I look back on some personal experiences .... We always spen[t as kids a
week with one set of grandparents and another set of grandparents, [and] it
happened to work out in our family that [it] turned out to be an enjoyable
experience. Maybe that can, in this family, if that is how it works out.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72.
23. In re Troxel, 940 P.2d 698 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), revd sub nom. In re Custody
of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000).
24. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Troxel (No. 99-138).
25. Troxel, 940 P.2d at 699.
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visitation was in the children's best interest.26 A few months after the
trial court's order, Kelly Wynn legally adopted Isabelle and Natalie.27
In spite of the trial court's legal and factual findings, the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the Troxel's petition,
holding that third parties, outside the context of a custody action, lack
standing to file for visitation under section 26.10.160(3) of the
Washington Revised Code.2s The Washington Supreme Court accepted
the case for review and affirmed. 9 The supreme court did not agree
with the appellate court's assessment of standing in the case and found
that the Washington visitation statute gave the Troxels standing to sue.3"
Nevertheless, the state supreme court arrived at the same conclusion,
namely that the Troxels could not obtain visitation rights under section
26.10.160(3) of the code, because that statute violated the fundamental
rights of parents to raise their children under the Federal Constitution.3I
In the state supreme court's opinion, the Constitution allows state
interference with parental rights only "to prevent harm or potential
26. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. The United States Supreme Court quoted the
Washington Superior Court as follows:
The Petitioners [the Troxels] are part of a large, central, loving family, all
located in this area, and the Petitioners can provide opportunities for the
children in the areas of cousins and music . . . . The court took into
consideration all factors regarding the best interest of the children and
considered all the testimony before it. The children would be benefitted [sic]
from spending quality time with the Petitioners, provided that that time is
balanced with time with the children['s] nuclear family. The court finds that
the children['s] best interests are served by spending time with their mother
and stepfather's other six children.
Id. at 61-62. The Superior Court's obscure reference to music becomes clear when
reading the petitioner's brief to the United States Supreme Court. See Brief for
Petitioner at 2 n.1, Troxel (No. 99-138). The grandfather, Gary Troxel, belongs to a
music group. Id.
27. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 62. The adoption took place in February 1996. Smith, 969
P.2d at 23.
28. Troxel, 940 P.2d at 700. The Court of Appeals found this limitation "consistent
with the constitutional restrictions on state interference with parents' fundamental
liberty interest in the 'care, custody, and management' of their children." Id.
29. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), affd sub nom. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). The state supreme court consolidated the Troxel case
with two others. Id at 21. By the time the Washington Supreme Court issued its ruling,
Tommie and her husband, Kelly Wynn, had spent more than $50,000 before all three
courts. A Letter from the Parents in the Troxel v. Granville Case in the United States
Supreme Court, at http://www.parentsrights.org/troxel/wynnlet.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2001). Subsequently, the Granville-Wynns established the Wynn Legal Defense Fund
for continuation before the United States Supreme Court. Id.
30. Smith, 969 P.2d at 26.
31. IJdat30.
2001]
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harm to a child. 32 The Washington statute at issue, however, did not
require a "threshold showing of harm."'33 In addition, the supreme court
found that the statute was overbroad in that "any person" could petition
for visitation as long as the visitation was within the parameter of the
best interest of the child standard.34 The supreme court did not agree
that a state might determine child-rearing questions just because a trial
judge could imagine a "better" decision.35 The Washington Supreme
Court found that parents, rather than judges, "should be the ones to
choose whether to expose their children to certain people or ideas." '36
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 7 because Washing-
ton's grandparent visitation statute confronted constitutional issues
regarding parental rights.38
III. BACKGROUND
American family life has changed over the last century, affecting
the role of a considerable number of grandparents and other non-
parental parties. What is more, the number of older Americans has
risen,39 and they are asserting their rights in familial disputes more than
in the past.' Divorces, multiple and successive marriages, and single-
parent family units jolt grandparents in their endeavors to gain access
to their grandchildren. Against this background of societal changes,
long-held constitutional notions regarding parental rights increasingly
incur challenges by grandparents trying to assert visitation rights, or
32. Id.
33. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63; Smith, 969 P.2d at 30.
34. Smith, 969 P.2d at 30.
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id. at 63. However, four justices of the Washington Supreme Court dissented.
Id. at 23 (Talmudge, J., concurring/dissenting).
37. Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999).
38. The Court limited its review to the question of whether the Washington statute
violated the United States Constitution "as applied to Tommie Granville and her
family." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. Court observers were astonished when the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Profile, supra note 9. It was at the time the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari that Natalie and Isabelle Wynn learned of the
lawsuit, when their grandparents handed videotapes of the two to local TV stations. Id
Isabelle and Natalie were then seven and nine years old, respectively. Brief for
Petitioner at 21, Troxel (No. 99-138).
39. Amy K. Berman, Note, H.R. 4300, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1986:
Congress' Response to the Changing American Family, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 455, 457
(1987).
40. See Edward M. Burns, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Is It Time for the Pendulum
to Fall?, 25 FAM. L.Q. 59, 59 (1991).
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even obtain custody, despite the wishes of the parents. After a brief
glimpse at the changing realities of American families, this section
examines the constitutional development of parental rights as a
substantive due process issue.
A. Changing Realities of American Families and the States' Response
By the 1980s, members of the older generations became more
assertive of their concerns and rights in family issues.' Moreover,
approximately seventy-five percent of Americans were grandparents. 2
At the same time, approximately one million grandchildren per year had
to endure their parents' divorces.43 Such family dissolutions often
imposed great hardship on the grandparents' ability to visit their
grandchildren." Children were increasingly likely to live with a single
parent, or in a "blended" family, as a result of divorce and remarriage. 5
Today, the trends of the 1980s have progressed even more.' The
number of grandparents taking on the role of "long-term or permanent
caregivers" has risen sharply.47 The March 1998 Current Population
Survey found that approximately twenty million children under the age
of eighteen, roughly twenty-eight percent, lived in one-parent house-
holds.48 The same study revealed that approximately four million
children (almost six percent of all children under the age of eighteen)
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id
44. See id
45. Steven H. Hobbs, We Are Family: Changing Times, Changing Ideologies and
Changing Law, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 5 11, 512 (1985).
46. See Susan Dawson-Tibbits, Representing Grandparents Who Raise Grandchildren:
An Overview ofllinois Law, 87 ILL. B.J. 468, 468 & n.1 (1999).
47. Id; see also Catherine Bostock, Note, Does the Expansion of Grandparent
Visitation Rights Promote the Best Interests of the Child?: A Survey of Grandparent Visitation
Laws in the Fifty States, 27 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 319, 323 n.22 (1994)
(emphasizing that society reassesses grandparent rights because their roles within the
families "have already changed in response to family problems").
48. TERRY A. LUGAILA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARrTAL STATUS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE) i (1998). According to this study, 34.7% of
people between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four had never married, while only
56% of all adults were currently married. Id. In the same year, 9.8% of the adults were
currently divorced. Id. Most single-parent children, 84.10%, resided with their mothers,
of which number approximately 40% stayed with mothers who had never married. Id.
Children living with their father more typically were in the care of a divorced father
(44.4%) than a bachelor (33.3%). Id. Single-parent households often had no other adults
living in the same household (55.7%). Id.
2001)
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stayed with their grandparents.49 Thus, the meaning of "family" can
assume many different shapes, and therefore pose a formidable task of
adaptation for the law 5 -- not even to mention all the possible future
changes specifically for family law in the course of the twenty-first
century.5
In the meantime, however, these changes have led to a greater
grandparent lobby. 2 State legislatures, in turn, reacted by passing laws
concerning grandparent visitation rights." As a result, apart from the
now obsolete Washington statute,m all states have some form of
grandparent visitation statute. 5" Among those statutes, the "first
49. Id. Among those children living with their grandparents, 1.4 million had
neither parent available. Id The newly released tables of the 2000 Census list 7.2% of
all American households as "female householder, no husband present," with children
under 18 years. U.S. CENSUS BUREAu, PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHiC
CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES, TABLE DP-1 (2000), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/200l/tables/dpus_200o.PDF. For
Arkansas, the percentage is 7.4. Id. The number of families with no husband present
(21% increase) rose three times faster than "married-couple families" (7% increase).
See Press Release, United States Census Bureau, Nation's Median Age Highest Ever,
But 65-and-Over Population's Growth Lags, Census 2000 Shows (May 16, 2000),
available at http://www.census.gov./Press-Release/www/ 2001/cb0lcn67.html.
50. See Hobbs, supra note 45, at 513. Hobbs questions whether "our notions on the
family in society [have] changed so much that the assumptions upon which our family
laws are based are no longer valid, thus rendering family law ineffective as a
mechanism for ordering family life." Id. See generally Sally B. Gold, The Changing
Family Structure in the 20th Century, MD. B.J., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 15 (discussing Maryland
family law changes in the face of familial-structural developments of the last hundred
years).
51. See Gold, supra note 50, at 19. Gold predicts resolutions and changes regarding
same-sex marriages and their respective consequences in custody and visitation rights.
Id. She also expects changes because of the rapidly developing reproduction
technology. Id. Family law should also undergo changes because of new concepts like
cyberspace adultery, changed parental availability for child care (and custody) due to
an increase in telecommuting, and new types of property interests to be considered in
divorce proceedings. Id.
52. Bums, supra note 40, at 59; see also Bostock, supra note 47, at 322
(emphasizing that the "demographic composition of the voting public has increased the
political power of older Americans"); id at 325 (discussing the "formidable political
force of the 'senior lobby"'). As an interesting aside, six of the nine United States
Supreme Court Justices are grandparents as well, and Justice Thomas grew up in his
grandparents' home. Ben Fenton, US Court Asked to Rule on Grandparent Rights, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2842364.
53. Bums, supra note 40, at 59-60; see also Hobbs, supra note 45, at 514 (asserting
that law reform follows "changing mores, experiences, realities and ideologies of
society").
54. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160 (West Supp. 2001).
55. See David L. Walther, Survey of Grandparents' Visitation Rights, 11 AM. J. FAM.
L. 95, 104 (1997). See generally ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-4.1, 26-IOA-30 (Supp. 2000);
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(a) (Michie 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (West
206 [Vol. 24
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generation" statutes concerned grandparent visitation "with their
deceased child's children."'  The "second generation" statutes also
reached out to grandparents whose children failed to obtain custody in
family dissolution cases." Some states provide for grandparent
visitation in certain kinds of adoption cases,"' or in cases where there is
proof of paternity of extra-marital children. 9 Twenty-one states allow
grandparent visitation premised exclusively on the "best interest of the
2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie Repl. 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3103-3104
(West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1-117, -117.5 (West 2000); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031(7) (Repl. 1999); FLA.
STAT. ANN. chs. 752.01, 39.509 (West Supp. 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (Supp.
1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 57146.3 (Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 32-719 (Michie 1996);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607(bXl) (West Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17-5-
1 to -10 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-129 (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie 1999); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE
ANN., art. 1264 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1801-1804 (West 1998);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Repl. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §
39D (West Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b (West Supp. 2000); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (1994); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 452.402 (West Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1999); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 43-1802 (Lexis Repl. 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125C.050,
432B.560(1)(c) (Michie Supp. 1999 & Lexis Repl. 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-
458:17-d (Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-9-2 (Michie Repl. 1999); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 72, 240(1) (McKinney 1999 &
Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.2(bi), -13.2A, -13.50) (Lexis 1999); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Repl. 1997) (held unconstitutional by the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291 (N.D. 1999), because the state had no
compelling interest to assume that grandparent visitation was in the child's best interest
without first affording the parents an opportunity to rebut this presumption); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3109.05.1(B)(1), 3109.11, 3109.12 (Anderson Repl. 2000); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5, 7505-6.5 (West Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (Supp. 1998);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5311-5314 (West Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-5-24.1
to -24.3 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7420(33) (West Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 254-52i -54 (LEXIS Rev. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-302 (Supp. 2000);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.433-153.434 (West Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-
3-5(4)(a), -5-2 (Supp. 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1012, 1013 (Repl. 1989); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-124.1, -124.2 (Michie Repl. 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2B-1
(LEXIS Repl. 1999); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.245, 880.155 (West Supp. 2000); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (LEXIS 2001).
56. Walther, supra note 55, at 95. Statutes referring only to visitation with the dead
offspring's children were among the earliest of their kind. Id.
57. Id. Of these statutes, many eventually also covered grandparents whose
children did obtain custody. Id.
58. Id. This refers especially to stepparent adoptions. Id.
59. Id. Arkansas courts have given grandparent visitation in cases involving proof
of paternity of extra-marital children. Interview with Robin L. Mays, Circuit Judge,
Pulaski County Circuit Court, in Little Rock, Ark. (Apr. 2001).
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child," without regard to trigger-events such as divorce or death.' Of
course, this standard, the best interest of the child, comes in variations.6'
Nonetheless, the mere fact that all states have some form of
grandparent visitation appears to indicate that a sizable section of
society deems the role of grandparents beneficial to the child.62 A
familial "sense of crisis" pervades the grandparent movement, feeding
into fond and popular imaginations of the extended family of the past.63
In the eyes of politicians and courts, grandparents turn into family value
"watchdogs" and emergency rescuers." In letter and spirit of this
philosophy, grandparents are a stabilizing element amid an ever-
changing society.6'
However, these sentiments do not rest on scientific studies." While
some behavioral scientists confirm that "typical grandparents" have a
"'companionate' relationship with their grandchildren," '7 many studies
seem to reflect little more than an "intermittent" relationship between
60. Walther, supra note 55, at 96. But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(e) (creating a
rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation does not fit the child's best interest
if the parents do not allow such visitation).
61. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(3) (West 1998) (providing for
possible grandparent visitation if in the best interest of the child and if visitation does
not interfere with the "parent-child relationship or with the parent's rightful authority
over the child"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(2)(a)(2) (West Supp. 2001) (resembling
the Maine provision); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1802(2) (LEXIS Repl. 1999)
(providing standard of clear and convincing evidence that grandparent visitation will
not "adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-
24.3(a)(2)(v) (1996) (providing presumption that parents' decision to refuse
grandparent visitation is reasonable, rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence). But
see Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-16-3(2)(a) (1994) (allowing grandparent visitation only upon
showing that the parents' objection to visitation is unreasonable); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.121(lXa)(B) (Supp. 1998) (providing for grandparent visitation only upon denial
of "reasonable opportunity to visit").
62. Jeff Atkinson, Troxel v. Granville: Seeking to Balance the Interests of
Grandparents, Children, and Parents, 14 AM. J. FAM. L. 1, 4 (2000). While all fifty states
have grandparent visitation statutes, some states also allow visitation to other classes
of people, like great-grandparents (fourteen states), stepparents (nine), siblings of the
child (ten), or simply "any person" (twelve). Id. at 5 n.28.
63. Bostock, supra note 47, at 323-24.
64. Id at 324.
65. Id. at 323 n.24. Bostock quotes Representative Olympia Snowe: "Fortunately,
amidst our changing society one thing has remained the same: the unique bond that
only exists between a child and a grandparent." Id. (citing Grandparents Rights:
Preserving Generational Bonds, 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Services of
the House Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1991) (statement of Rep.
Snowe)).
66. See Walther, supra note 55, at 98.
67. Id. This study surveyed 510 American grandparents, but excluded the
grandchildren. Id.
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grandparents and grandchildren." Such relationships differ depending
on a variety of factors such as "geographical proximity, age, health
status, socioeconomic conditions, employment, and marital status of
grandparents, as well as the age and gender of the child." 9 Most
significantly, there exist no studies of "intact families under court-
ordered grandparent visitation."7
B. Substantive Due Process: The Liberty to Exercise Parental Rights
There may exist a lack of behavioral studies of intact families
under court-ordered visitation, but the law offers its protection
whenever individuals join in domestic relationships that the law
considers to be a "family."' This subsection briefly investigates the
development of the parental rights doctrine under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.72
1. Due Process Is More than Fair Process
In Washington v. Glucksberg, a case dealing with physician-assisted
suicide, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause "guarantees more than fair
process." '74 The Court also reaffirmed that the Due Process Clause
shields "certain fundamental rights and liberty interests" against state
interference." While thus confirming the substantive aspect of due
process jurisprudence, the Court declined to recognize physician-
assisted suicide as a fundamental right.76 To arrive at this conclusion,
the Court conducted a brief, but thorough excursion through history and
68. Id. In one study, criticized for methodological shortcomings, only 30 of 300
grandparents claimed a relationship "other than [an] intermittent one." Id.
69. Id. Another study suggests that the degree of grandparental involvement might
also depend on gender of the grandparents, marital status of the children, and maternal
or paternal lines of the family. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Hobbs, supra note 45, at 519. The author explains that such a family unit
usually arises with marriage, but can also come into existence in non-marital
cohabitation, and by virtue of the birth of a child (between mother and child). Id.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no "State [shall] deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
73. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Justice Scaliajoined the majority opinion. Id. at 704.
74. Id. at719.
75. Id. at 720 (specifically stating that the Clause offers "heightened protection").
76. Id. at 706. The plaintiffs were physicians in the state of Washington, along with
three terminally ill patients and a nonprofit organization, Compassion in Dying. Id at
707-08.
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the various state laws on suicide." Even though, in considering
physician-assisted suicide, the Court addressed an issue in many ways
distinct from parental rights, the issue nonetheless touched on very
intimate and personal concerns, just like parental rights. The Court's
historical approach illustrates its method of analyzing fundamental
rights issues in general, and touches on another, somewhat earlier case
involving termination of life, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health.8 In that case, a woman remained in a vegetative state after a
near-fatal car accident." The Court upheld the state's decision not to
allow life-support termination without clear and convincing evidence
that termination truly corresponded with the patient's will." Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion appeared to have pointed the way for
Glucksberg.8' Quite in tune with Justice Scalia's approach, the Court
now appears to consider the text of the Constitution, but also history
and tradition, as the decisive factors to determine fundamental rights. 2
Consequently, the Court uses the following fundamental-rights
test. 3 First, due process protection extends to those fundamental rights
which are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"'84 and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," so that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.""5 The second prong of the
fundamental-rights test consists of the Court's requirement of a
"'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.""
It seems a fair summary, then, to conclude that if a right is "deeply
rooted" and its protection and concern occurs throughout a substantial
part of history, such a right is fundamental, and consequently enjoys
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protection." Therefore, at least
certain legal scholars argue that it seems high time to turn toward
parental rights and liberty as fundamental rights."
77. Id. at 710-19.
78. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
79. Id. at 266.
80. Id. at 284.
81. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711 (citing Scalia's concurrence in Cruzan
regarding the immense Anglo-American common-law history against suicide and
assisting suicide).
82. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
84. Id. (citing, among others, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502
(1977) (plurality opinion)).
85. Id. at 721 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)).
86. Id. (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 62, at 3.
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2. Parental Rights and Liberty
Just as Justice O'Connor noted in the Troxel case, parental interest
in virtually all aspects of child rearing might well be the first fundamen-
tal liberty that the Supreme Court recognized."9 This subsection
examines some of the main cases that established parental interests and
liberties as a fundamental right.
a. The liberty to have a home, raise children, and control
their education
A little more than seventy-five years ago, the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged in Meyer v. Nebraska" the right of parents
to make a home and raise children9 and to control their education.' In
Meyer, a Nebraska school teacher ran afoul of a state statute that
prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students who had not
passed the eighth grade.9a While the Court's analysis at times ap-
proached that of an Equal Protection Clause challenge," the opinion
stayed clearly within the parameter of the Due Process fundamental
rights analysis." The Court specifically referred to the historical
89. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). On a more general note, the
common-law tradition did not afford grandparents any more rights to visit their
grandchildren than any person outside the family would have had. Bostock, supra note
47, at 326. Fit parents could block grandparents visitation under the parental rights
doctrine. Id. This doctrine protected parental autonomy. Id. at 328. As a quaint aside,
civil law traditions were quite similar, as a nineteenth-century Louisiana case
demonstrated. See Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894) (holding that during
the parents' lifetime, grandparents have no right of action regarding the grandchildren).
90. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer, like Troxel, draws heavy criticism from those who
see substantive due process as a constitutional error. See, e.g., Gregory J. Sullivan,
Troxel Was a Bad Law, But Not an Unconstitutional One, N.J. L.J., July 24, 2000, at 27
("[The Court has used the due process clause to determine whether the substance of
the law is acceptable. If a majority of the Court disagrees with the law, then it is
declared unconstitutional, even though it transgresses no provision of the
Constitution.").
91. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
92. See id. at 400.
93. Id. at 397; see also Andrew Schepard, Muddled Impact of the High Court's
Grandparent Visitation Decision, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 2000, at 3 (pointing out the post-
World War I hostile attitudes toward Germany implicit in the Meyer case).
94. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (referring to the fact that Latin, Greek, and Hebrew
were not within the prohibition, but all modem languages were).
95. See id. at 399-400. The Court inquired whether the state "unreasonably
infinge[d]" on a Fourteenth Amendment liberty. Id. at 399. Thus, using a balancing
test, the Court found that Nebraska had not made a successful case for state
interference. Id. at 403. Incidentally, the case also involved religious aspects, in that the
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significance of education in America and the role of the parent to
provide education "suitable to their station in life."'
Only a few years after Meyer, the Supreme Court reaffirmed in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters97 the parental right to control children's
education." The Court buttressed the earlier Meyer decision in the face
of an Oregon statute requiring every child between eight and sixteen
years old to attend public school." Guardians or parents had to comply
upon threat of a misdemeanor prosecution."° The Society of Sisters was
a corporation caring for orphans and running Catholic schools. I"' The
Oregon Act caused parents to withdraw their children from Society of
Sisters establishments.'" After a brief balancing of state and private
interests, the Court emphasized in its holding that parents and guardians
have the liberty to "direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control."' 3  Oregon's legislation had no "reasonable
relation" to a competent state purpose, and thus violated constitutionally
guaranteed rights.' 0
b. Prince v. Massachusetts 5-Limits on the right to "custody,
care, and nurture"
During the last years of World War II, the United States Supreme
Court confronted a Massachusetts child labor law provision" and
school at issue was a Lutheran institution, and, thus, the teaching of German was at
least arguably also a religious concern. Id at 397. After all, the Lutheran school, based
upon a German-origin denomination, used German-language Biblical stories. See id
96. Id at 400 (holding that the right of parents to hire somebody to teach their
children a foreign language is "within the liberty of the Amendment").
97. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
98. See Id. at 534-35.
99. See id. at 530. The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 contained certain
exemptions that were irrelevant in the case. Id. at 530-31.
100. Id at 530.
101. Id. at 531-32.
102. Id at 532.
103. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. The Court specifically pointed out that the "child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." Id at 535.
104. Id at 535.
105. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
106. See id. at 160. The provisions stated that "no boy under twelve and no girl
under eighteen shall sell [anything] in any street or public place." Id at 160-61.
Supplying children with articles for sale, for the purpose of having the children
commercially distribute those goods, constituted a misdemeanor. Id. at 161.
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upheld it.'"7 Sarah Prince, a Jehovah's Witness, was the aunt and
custodian of a nine-year-old girl, Betty Simmons. 8 The child was a
member of the same religion." As Jehovah's Witnesses, both Sarah and
Betty distributed pamphlets on the streets of Brockton, Massachusetts,
and received small funds in return."0 The State accused Sarah of using
Betty for child labor."' Notwithstanding the Court's affirmation of the
states' right to regulate child labor,"' the Justices took care to point out
that parents have a right to handle "custody, care and nurture of the
child" themselves."' The Court highlighted the "private realm of family
life" that remains beyond the grasp of state intervention."" The opinion
thus distinguished between the state's legitimate interests as parens
patriae"' and the private parental liberties."" The distribution of
religious pamphlets by children accordingly did not enjoy constitutional
protection because such activity did not fall within the scope of private
family matters.""
c. Wisconsin v. Yoder"--The "primary role" of parents as an
"enduring American tradition"
Approximately thirty years ago, the state of Wisconsin sought to
compel Amish children to attend public school beyond the eighth
grade." 9 The Amish refused outside, public school education beyond
the eighth grade because in their view, secular education impermissibly
107. Id. at 170.
108. Id. at 159.
109. Id at 161. Sarah Prince also had two sons, who accompanied her during the
time in question, but their actions were not at issue here. Id. at 161-62.
110. Id. at 161-62. Apparently, distribution of pamphlets did not always result in
receiving funds. Id at 161 n.4.
111. Prince, 321 U.S. at 160.
112. See id. at 166.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Latin for "parent of [the] country." BLACK's LAW DIcnoNARY 1137 (7th ed.
1999). Generally, the term indicates the state's role in guarding the legally disabled
(juveniles or insane). Id
116. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; see also Joan C. Bohl, Grandparent Visitation Law
Grows Up: The Trend Toward Awarding Visitation Only When the Child Would Otherwise
Suffer Harm, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 279, 285-86 (2000) (emphasizing the "narrowness" of
the parens patriae exception to parental rights).
117. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67.
118. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
119. Id. at 207. Wisconsin law provided compulsory school attendance until the
child reached the age of sixteen. Id. The Amish children, Frieda, Barbara, and Vernon,
were between fourteen and fifteen years of age. Id at 207 n. 1.
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and significantly interfered with their faith and "Ordnung."' 0 The State
subjected the parents to a trial and fined them five dollars each.' The
Court concluded that Yoder implicated "fundamental interests of
parents" even more so than Prince."z The Court referred to the "history
and culture of Western civilization [reflecting] a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children."'"
Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that this "primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition."''24 Consequently, Wisconsin
lost its case."
d. Other United States Supreme Court cases
The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed the constitutional
protection of parents' rights time and again. 6 In particular, the Court
has emphasized the importance of history and tradition in this country,
as well as in the entire Western world, supporting the fundamental right
of parents." 7 However, the Court has so far confined its constitutional
protection of the family to relatives, as in Moore v. City of East
120. Id. at 210-11. "Ordnung" here means church rules of the Amish. Id. at 210.
Post-eighth grade education would expose the Amish children to a setting "with
increasing emphasis on competition . . . with pressure to conform to the styles,
manners, and ways of the peer group, [taking the children] away from their community,
physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life."
Id. at 211.
121. Id. at 208. Wisconsin rejected a compromise reached in other states, like
Pennsylvania, under which the Amish could comply with the compulsory school
requirement by taking their children to an Amish vocational school and requiring the
children to keep journals on their daily farm and household duties (like an
apprenticeship system). Id. at 208-09 n.3.
122. Id. at 232.
123. Id.
124. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (emphasis added).
125. See id. at 234.
126. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (affirming
most recently the "long line of cases" upholding Meyer and Pierce); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (reaffirming again the parents' liberty interests in the
"care, custody, and management of their child"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979) (pointing out the Court's historical reflection of "Western civilization concepts
of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children"); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (affirming the constitutional protection of the
relationship between parent and child); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
(referring to the "custody, care and nurture" residing "first in the parents") (citing
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
127. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 602; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
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Cleveland.'28 In that case, the Supreme Court expanded the familial
protection only to the extended family, a grandmother living with a son
and grandchildren who were cousins.'29 Probably the most significant
point, though, lies in the fact that the Court continued the long line of
familial, and thus fundamental, rights cases, while guarding itself with
strong cautionary statements against "Lochnerism." 3 ° Nonetheless, the
Court has yet to hold that parental rights arise merely because of a
biological, genetic relationship.'3' Instead, parental rights stem from
"relationships more enduring." '32 However, ongoing relationships alone
are not always sufficient, either, especially where the Court balances a
biological father's interests against the interests of an existing family
unit.
33
To summarize, the Court has repeatedly examined American
history and tradition, and has concluded that parental rights are, in so
many words, "deeply rooted" fundamental rights. 34 However, this
128. 431 U.S. 494, 498-99(1977).
129. See id. at 504; see also id. at 495-97 (relating the facts). The Moore case
involved a city housing ordinance that accepted only certain relatives as "family"
allowed to dwell together in one unit. Id. at 495-96.
130. See id. at 502. "Lochnerism" refers to' substantive due process analysis of a
very negative kind, stemming from an infamous United States Supreme Court opinion
declaring unconstitutional a state law trying to protect bakery workers by setting
maximum working hours. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Lochner
case spawned a brief history of unfortunate judicial decisions, mostly focusing on a
"fundamental right to contract," which many modem legal scholars see akin to legal
missteps like the ominous and horridly consequential Dred Scott decision at the eve of
the American Civil War. See Sullivan, supra note 90, at 27; see, e.g., Morehead v. New
York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (declaring unconstitutional a state minimum
wage law for women); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (declaring
unconstitutional maximum prices for gasoline); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350
(1928) (declaring unconstitutional maximum prices for employment agencies); Tyson
& Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (declaring unconstitutional maximum prices
for theater tickets); Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (declaring
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the use of "shoddy," rags and debris, in making
mattresses); Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (declaring
unconstitutional a law requiring standardized weights for bread loaves); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (declaring unconstitutional a state minimum
wage law for women).
131. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983) (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
132. Id. (citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
133. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Justice Scalia pointed out that, according to the precedents, parental liberty instead rests
on history and tradition of the "unitary family." Id. In that case, the biological father
had a relationship with the child (conceived in an extra-marital affair), but the mother
had in the meantime returned to her husband, who also had developed a relationship
with the child. Id. at 113-15.
134. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
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recognition has not come without caution and certain limits.'35 Parents
are not free to do with their children entirely as they please,'36 nor is the
Court willing to extend the constitutional protection of familial
structures beyond family relations, 37 or conversely, merely hinge such
protection on relatedness alone. 3' Parents' rights, however, clearly are
established fundamental rights.'39
3. The Presumption That Fit Parents Act in the Best Interest of the
Child
In its discussion of Western family traditions, the Supreme Court
has utilized certain presumptions regarding parental fitness and best
interest of the child. 4 ° According to the law, a parent has the "maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment" that a child lacks.'4 ' The law has
long acknowledged that parents act in the best interest of their children
because of "natural bonds of affection."' 42 Quite naturally, the Court
immediately conceded that this presumption remains rebuttable by
incidents of child abuse or neglect. 43 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
has refused to "discard wholesale" the general notion that parents attend
to the best interest of their offspring.'"
The presumption of parental fitness bears significance in a variety
of circumstances, such as in custody proceedings. 4 ' The state's interest
in child care becomes "de minimis" if the parent indeed is fit. 4
6
Conversely, in Quilloin v. Walcott, 47 the Court held that a parent who has
never sought custody, nor had any relationship with the child, cannot
raise a best-interest-of-the-child standard and the implicit presumption
135. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
136. See id.
137. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977).
138. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983).
139. This note discusses Justice Scalia's concerns regarding the constitutional
acknowledgment of fundamental parents' rights in Part IV, as he expressed himself to
that extent in his dissenting opinion of the Troxel case. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra Part IV.C.
140. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id at 602-03.
145. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The State of Illinois attempted to
take custody from an unwed father without conducting hearings to determine that the
father actually was unfit. Id. at 646.
146. Id. at 657-58.
147. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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of a fit parent in attempting to obtain visitation rights after the birth
mother had initiated adoption procedures.'
The best-interest-of-the-child standard, however, is not actually a
constitutional standard. 49 This standard derived from custody proceed-
ings, typically as part of a divorce."0 In many instances, especially
where state institutions have substituted as parents, there does not even
exist a best interest standard, but rather a standard of adequate care, or
"minimum requirements.""'
Nonetheless, the presumption of fit parents attending to the best
interest of their children weighs heavily in the discussion of parental
rights and liberties."' The presumption supports the notion of parental
rights as a fundamental right, in that it renders a further reason for
constitutionally protecting the parent-child relationship."'
Thus concluding the background survey of parental right cases
before the United States Supreme Court, it appears well established that
parental rights fall under the canopy of fundamental rights pursuant to
substantive due process analysis." While such parental liberties and
rights have their limits,"' the presumption that fit parents act in the best
interest of their children supports -the constitutionally protected
character of parental rights." 6 How then does the Troxel case, with its
specific issue concerning grandparental rights, fit into the history of
parental rights cases?
IV. REASONING
In Troxel v. Granville,"' the United States Supreme Court held that
section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington violated the
148. See id. at 247 (laying out the facts); id. at 256 (holding).
149. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993).
150. Id. at 303; see also Atkinson, supra note 62, at 2 (stating that the best interest
doctrine has existed for over one hundred years, "[m]ore often than not" as a kind of
balancing test between the competing parental parties' ability to provide for the child).
151. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 304.
152. Mary E. O'Connell, The 'Troxel' Tightrope, NAT'L L.J., June 26, 2000, at A20.
The author makes the connection between Parham's fit parent presumption and the
constitutional protection of parental rights in that constitutional protection "is the best
possible way to protect the interests of children." Id.
153. See Bohl, supra note 116, at 296 (explaining that fit parents ought to be able to
enjoy parental autonomy in a grandparent visitation context regardless of their marital
status).
154. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
155. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
156. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
157. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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United States Constitution in that it encroached on the fundamental
parental right to determine matters of "care, custody, and control" of
their children." 8 The Court distinctly limited its holding to the facts of
the case before it, referring only to the appellee, Tommie Granville, and
her family." 9 After a brief excursion into the history of parental rights
cases before the Supreme Court,"W the plurality opinion of Troxel
discussed what the Justices deemed the overbreadth of the Washington
grandparent visitation statute and its application to the Granville
family.'
6 1
The plurality opinion agreed with the concurring opinions of
Justices Souter and Thomas in that parental rights enjoy the constitu-
tional protection of fundamental rights. 62 Additionally, Justice Souter
agreed with the plurality opinion in that the Washington statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad. 63 Furthermore, Justice Souter also agreed
with the plurality that the Court need not decide whether every
grandparent visitation statute needs a harm-to-the-child requirement.'"
Thus, the United States Supreme Court upheld parental rights as a
fundamental right with a six-vote majority, and declared the Washing-
ton statute unconstitutionally overbroad, as well as refused to discuss
a harm-to-the-child standard, with a five-vote majority.
A. Plurality Opinion' 6 '
The Court began its analysis of the present case by taking a closer
look at what Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion called the "breathtak-
158. Id at 75.
159. Seeid. at67.
160. See id at 65-67.
161. See id. at 67. Justice O'Connor announced the plurality opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer; Justices Souter and Thomas
filed concurring opinions; and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy dissented. Id, at
60. Concerning the overbreadth, Justice O'Connor asked in the oral arguments: "'[A]ny
person' at 'any time' can march in and ask a court in the best interests of the child to
order some kind of visitation? I mean, this is a breathtakingly broad provision, is it
not?" Atkinson, supra note 62, at I. Concern with overbreadth reached across the
bench, from Justices O'Connor to Scalia. See id.
162. See infra Part IV.B.
163. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 76 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter actually saw
the Washington statute invalidated based on its text alone, not its application, unlike
the plurality opinion. See id (Souter, J., concurring).
164. See infra Part IV.B.
165. Some commentators chose to view the plurality and the concurrence as a 6-3
majority opinion. See Rebecca Porter, Supreme Court Delivers Narrow Ruling on
Grandparents' Visitation Rights, TRIAL, Aug. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 15000437.
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ingly broad" language of the statute involved."6 The statute provided
that "[a]ny person" could file for visitation "at any time."'67 The trial
court could bestow visitation rights any time it appeared in the "best
interest of the child."'" Hence, the Court found that the statute
practically allowed "any third party" to call for judicial review of
parental visitation decisions. 69 The Court remarked that the Washington
statute did not lend any "presumption of validity or any weight whatso-
ever" to parental decision-making. 70 Rather, the nonparental visitation
provision left the best-interest question entirely with the state judge,
enabling the judge to trump the parents' decision.""
In tune with its overbreadth analysis, the United States Supreme
Court also noted that the state supreme court could have given the
statute a narrower reading, but did not do so.'" Indeed, the trial court
proceeded entirely in the spirit of a broad statutory reading.'73 The lower
court did not base its order on any specific factors that might have
explained the judicial meddling with parental rights. 74 The Court saw
itself forced to conclude that section 26.10.160(3) violated the Due
Process Clause as applied. 75
Moreover, the Court remarked that neither the Troxels nor the state
court had found Tommie Granville an unfit parent. 76 In light of the
legal presumption that fit parents attend to the best interests of their
children, this lack of finding on behalf of the lower court became
particularly significant.'" If parents "adequately" attend to the needs of
their children, states may not intrude into the privacy of family life and
doubt the parents' competence to determine the best course of rearing
their progeny.7 8
166. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67. Instead, the Washington Supreme Court underlined the
broad nature of the statute: "[The statute] allow[s] any person, at any time, to petition
for visitation without regard to relationship to the child, without regard to changed
circumstances, and without regard to harm." In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 23
(Wash. 1998).
173. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.
174. See id
175. Id. at 75.
176. Id. at 68.
177. See id. (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
178. Id. at 68-69.
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However, according to the Court, the trial court's application of the
law even reversed the fit-parent presumption.' The trial court did not
give "special weight" to Granville's assessment of her children's best
interests." In the view of the plurality opinion, the trial judge effec-
tively imposed on Granville the "burden of disproving" that the
grandparent visitation served the best interests of the children.'"
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the
trial judge's reversal of the fit-parent presumption did not protect
Granville's fundamental right to determine matters of raising her
daughters." 2 The Court contrasted the situation with a number of other
states' visitation statutes. "  Given the reality and potential of
intergenerational conflicts, a judge should give "at least some special
weight" to a fit parent's decisions.'"
Last, the United States Supreme Court observed that the Granville
disagreement arose from a difference of opinion concerning the quantity
of visitation, not its total cancellation. "5 Granville maintained her
willingness to support some visitation throughout the entire legal
battle. 86 The Court focused on the fact that the trial judge discarded the
mother's proposal regarding visitation times, and instead arranged for
a "middle ground."8 7 This judicial action contrasted starkly with other
state statutes that provide for grandparent visitation only if a parent has
"unreasonably denied" such visitation. "
Thus, the United States Supreme Court concluded in a majority that
the trial court's reasoning for granting visitation to the grandparents
contained constitutional flaws. 9 In particular, the Court pointed out the
failure of the lower court to give any "material weight" to a "fit
179. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.
180. Id. However, Justice O'Connor never explained what "special weight" means.
See Schepard, supra note 93, at 4.
181. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69. The Court quoted the trial judge: "I think [visitation
with the Troxels] would be in the best interest of the children and I haven't been shown
it is not in [the] best interest of the children." Id.
182. Id. at 69-70.
183. See id. at 70; see also supra note 61 (discussing visitation statutes limiting
grandparent visitation rights).
184. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70.
185. See id. at 71.
186. See id. The Court cited Granville's attorney: "Right off the bat we'd like to say
that our position is that grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the children. It
is a matter of how much and how it is going to be structured." Id.
187. Id.
188. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 59.
189. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72. See infra Part IV.B for the concurring opinions of
Justices Souter and Thomas, agreeing with the Court's fundamental rights analysis.
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custodial parent.""' Specifically, the Supreme Court found a problem
in that the trial court's only two written fact findings-namely, that the
Troxel grandparents are a nearby large family, and that the grandchil-
dren would benefit from such contacts--only served to buttress the trial
judge's pre-conceived presumption favoring the grandparents'
request. 9 ' However, due process does not allow a state to violate
fundamental parental rights concerning "childrearing decisions" just
because the state proposed "a 'better' decision."'"
Nonetheless, the Court deliberately refused to ponder the constitu-
tional question actually before the Court.'93 The Washington Supreme
Court had posed the issue whether due process necessitates that every
"nonparental" visitation statute contain a requirement of proof of harm
to the child as a necessary condition to grant visitation.'" By declining
to delineate the "precise scope" of parents' rights in grandparent
visitation cases, the Court agreed with the dissenting opinion of Justice
Kennedy, in that the constitutionality of a visitation statute hinges on its
distinct application and the given facts.' 9 The Court did not deem it
appropriate to hold any nonparental visitation statute unconstitutional
"as a per se matter," since state courts normally adjudicate those
disputes "on a case-by-case basis."'"
B. Concurring Opinions
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, deeming it sufficient that
the highest court of Washington had facially invalidated the statute at
issue.'97 The Supreme Court Justice expressed some concern that
190. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 72-73.
193. Id. at 73.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. The United States Supreme Court cited a number of
state court decisions as well as all fifty states' grandparent visitation statutes. See id. at
73-74. See also Fairbanks v. McCarter, 622 A.2d 121, 126-27 (Md. 1993) (equating
best-interest standard of a grandparent visitation statute with judicial deliberation of
certain factors, such as the nature of the child's relationships with the parents and
grandparents, along with the frequency of interaction, the benefits and detriments of the
respective alternatives, etc.); Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417, 418 (Va. 1998)
(reading a Virginia statute to ask for a "finding of harm as condition precedent to
awarding visitation").
197. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring). Unlike the plurality opinion,
Justice Souter saw the Washington statute invalidated based on its text, not its
application. Id. at 76 (Souter, J., concurring).
2001]
UALR LAW REVIEW
needlessly addressing questions of statutory applications not actually
before the Court "do[es] not call for turning any fresh furrows in the
'treacherous field' of substantive due process."" In Justice Souter's
eyes, there existed no reason to go any further.'"
Nonetheless, the Justice acknowledged the due process protection
of parental liberties in raising children2 as well as the constitutionally
overbroad language of the Washington statute.2 °" The Supreme Court of
Washington, in Justice Souter's opinion, resolved the case
accordingly.2" Since the state supreme court read the statute literally,
the statute simply was unconstitutional on its face.2 3 Accordingly,
Justice Souter quickly dismissed the need to discuss whether harm to
the child is a required factor in a grandparent visitation proceeding.2 °'
Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment. 5 The Justice
expressly refused to state his view on matters of parental rights and
substantive due process, since he did not understand the parties as
having challenged such issues.2' Justice Thomas saw as controlling in
this case the United States Supreme Court decisions regarding parental
rights." 7 However, the Justice would have liked for the plurality to state
the appropriate standard of review, which should have been strict
scrutiny in his view.0 '
198. See id. at 76 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
199. See id. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring). In his view, the state supreme court
decided the case on two grounds: (1) the lack of a "harm to the child" standard; and (2)
the overbreadth regarding "any person," and "at any time." See id. at 76 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
200. See id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring).
201. See id. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
202. See id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring).
203. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring).
204. Id at 77 (Souter, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas's opinion appears
particularly interesting, for he is actually a "vigorous opponent" of a fundamental right
of abortion, since it has "no textual constitutional foundation." Schepard, supra note 93,
at 4. However, Justice Thomas may not have been particularly interested in the case,
given that he allegedly "spent most of his time [during oral arguments] looking at the
walls and rubbing his face [and asking] no questions." Atkinson, supra note 62, at 5
n.27.
206. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
207. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)). However, Justice Thomas apparently would have liked to have had an
opportunity to discuss the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a possible alternative
justification for a constitutional protection of parental rights. See id at n. 1 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
208. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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C. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens dissented.2" While he would have denied certiorari
altogether, the Justice urged that the Court address the federal questions
at issue.?" Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court and the Supreme
Court of Washington in the assessment of the federal constitutional
issues.2" ' In his dissent, he found it particularly unreconcilable that the
state supreme court held the statute per se unconstitutional, but Justice
O'Connor found the statute unconstitutional only as applied.212 Justice
Stevens further expressed that the review of trial court legal applica-
tions properly should remain the task of state appellate courts, and not
of the United States Supreme Court.2"3 After all, the trial court had little,
if any, guidance "as to the proper test" in grandparent visitation cases
similar to the Troxel scenario.2"4 Justice Stevens asserted that any
critique on the trial court decision could only stem from a "guess" of
that court's application of the statute.2" He further disagreed with
Justice O'Connor in that he did not see any kind of anti-parent
presumption in the trial court's decision." 6
Additionally, Justice Stevens did not agree with Justice Souter that
the Washington Supreme Court allegedly delivered a "definitive
construction" of the statute that inevitably rendered it unconstitutional
per se.2t7 Accordingly, Justice Stevens saw himself confronted with an
unconstrued state statute and a state supreme court opinion that
incorrectly interpreted the Federal Constitution.18
The Justice asserted that Washington misinterpreted the
overbreadth of the statute as well as the perceived necessity of any
harm-to-the-child requirement.1 9 Instead, he proposed that a statute
should survive facial challenges if the statute employs a "plainly
209. Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 80-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 81-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Id & n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing In re Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 703
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (Ellington, J., dissenting)).
215. Id at 82 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, however, pointed out that
there "is no need to hypothesize about how the Washington courts might apply [the
section] because the Washington Superior Court did apply the statute in this very case."
Id. at 74.
216. See id. at 82 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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legitimate sweep."" 0 Given such a reading, the most typical petitioner
for child visitation, despite any broad statutory language, probably still
was a "once-custodial caregiver."'" Thus, the statute obviously en-
compassed many permissible applicants, and did not violate the Due
Process Clause.2"
In a similar vein, the Justice knew of no United States Supreme
Court case requiring the statute to include a harm-to-the-child
standard.m Notwithstanding the Court's affirmation of parental rights,
the Court has never raised a "rigid constitutional shield" to protect
every parental determination possible.' Indeed, parental rights have
their limits. ' Justice Stevens noted that "even a fit parent" can treat a
child "like a mere possession."
Rather, Justice Stevens advocated the recognition of another
party's rights in grandparent visitation disputes: the child's.2" Even
though there exists no Supreme Court opinion on a child's liberty
interests in the visitation context, he believed the children's interests
should factor into the "equation" between grandparents and parents as
well. 8 The Justice cast a wary eye on a parent's "isolated right," in fear
that it may lead to a capricious exercise of power over the child. 9
Because the Washington statute at issue did nothing else than to take
the children's interests into account as well, a legitimate state concern
under the Due Process Clause, Justice Stevens dissented.230
For quite different reasons, Justice Scalia also filed a dissenting
opinion." He placed parental rights among the "unalienable Rights" set
out in the Declaration of Independence and in those rights "retained by
the people" under the Ninth Amendment. 2  However, because the
Declaration of Independence did not give power to the courts to
220. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
739-40 & n.7) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
221. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 85-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Stevens's opinion is the only one
specifically focusing on the child's rights. Ronald Nelson, Troxel v. Granville: The
Supreme Court Wades into the Quagmire of Third-Party Visitation, 12 DIVORcE LMG. 101,
107 (2000).
228. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. See id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. See id. at 91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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adjudicate such rights, and the Ninth Amendment did not actually
affirmatively enumerate any concrete rights, the issue was not properly
before the Court. 3 Justice Scalia would much rather have the state
legislatures than the courts discuss unenumerated rights that may have
existed in the background of the framers' minds. 4 The Justice repeated
his wont criticism of substantive due process rights.35
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia refrained from urging the Court to
overrule earlier cases of parental rights; he merely wished not to extend
the principle to a further application.2?6 Justice Scalia showed concern
that a judicial adherence to parental unenumerated rights necessarily
also invokes the need for creating judicial definitions of what a parent
is, and of what constitutes harm to the child. 7 Inhis view, this leads to
a judicially, and federally, dictated body of family law." According to
the Justice, this constitutes a situation in which federal judges are no
better off making determinations than state legislatures, and indeed,
would do so with a greater geographic range of potential harm. 239
Third, and last, Justice Kennedy dissented.2' He disagreed with the
Supreme Court of Washington's assessment that a harm-to-the-child
standard was necessary in every instance.24' While United States
Supreme Court cases support the proposition that states can intervene
to shield children from harm, for Justice Kennedy, this is not yet to say
that every visitation case must invoke a harm-to-the-child standard.242
The Justice warned that the Washington Supreme Court operated under
the assumption that the parents resisting the visitation always are the
"primary caregivers," and those seeking visitation never have a
233. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, when the attorney for the Troxels began to
elaborate on children's constitutional claims, Justice Scalia "bellowed, 'A child does
not belong to the courts, a child belongs to the parents."' Tony Mauro, Scope of
Visitation Law Questioned, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 13, 2000, at 1, 8.
234. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Scalia's view, the split decisions of the
present case indicated how little substantive due process rights constitute legal
principles of "substantial reliance." Id, (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia remarked that Granville only asserted
a substantive due process right, but did not give him an opportunity to assess claims of
enumerated rights, such as the children's First Amendment rights of association. Id. at
n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
24 1. See id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 97 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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"legitimate and established relationship" with the children. 243 However,
the "conventional nuclear family" has little bearing on the prevailing
realities in many families.2' Rather, Justice Kennedy pondered, a third
party seeking visitation probably had assumed some care over the child,
building a relationship with the child.245 Kennedy maintained that states
should be able to make laws in consideration of certain relationships,
attempting to avoid harm to the child, by implementing a best interest
standard.2"
The application of the best interest standard remained constitu-
tional according to Justice Kennedy, depending on "more specific
factors.""' Family courts in every state address this standard in a
variation of fact patterns daily.2" On that level, parental rights ought to
receive constitutional protection by "using the discipline and instruction
of the case law system." '249 In the present case, Justice Kennedy would
have thus preferred to reverse the Washington holding that the best
interest standard is always unconstitutional in grandparent visitation
cases."' He desired further proceedings to determine the constitutional-
ity of the present case, which to him remained ultimately a task for the
state court.25" '
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Apart from any existing intemational interest in American
grandparent visitation law, 2 the United States Supreme Court decision
243. Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
245. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
246. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 100 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
249. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But see Douglas W. Kmiec, Family Feud: U.S.
Supreme Court Undermines Parental Rights in Troxel', L.A. DAILY J., June 29, 2000, at
6 (questioning where "in our founding documents does the family law bar get a trial
period in which to intrude upon parental judgment").
250. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
251. Id at 102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy does, however, recognize
that the "attorney's fees alone might destroy [the] hopes and plans for the child's
future." Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Litigation per se can disrupt family life and
require constitutional protection for the family. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). However,
Justice O'Connor took the same reason not to remand the case. See id. at 75. Granville's
litigation costs were already substantial enough. Id O'Connor also asked during oral
arguments whether it was "fair to require a mother to pay $100,000 in fees to litigate
against the grandparents." Atkinson, supra note 62, at 1.
252. See Fenton, supra note 52, at 27; Ignaz Staub, Haben Grosseltern ein
Besuchsrecht?, Tagesanzeiger, Jan. 14, 2000, LEXIS, Country & Region, Germany,
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in Troxel requires a reading on at least three levels, as the subsequent
section will illuminate. First, as a parental rights case, Troxel provides
for a renewed exercise in constitutional interpretation and at the same
time reaffirms parental rights against the backdrop of the ongoing
substantive due process debate. Second, the Supreme Court case may
have a varying impact on the different grandparent visitation statutes in
all fifty states, including Arkansas, ranging from no effect whatsoever
to potentially successful constitutional challenges. Third, the plurality
opinion of Justice O'Connor leaves open the door for a continued
development of third-party visitation statutes, even though it held
unconstitutional a specific statute as applied to the Granville family.
A. Constitutional Reading and the Reaffirmation of Parental Rights
According to the constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky,
the case of Tommie Granville's little daughters and their disappointed
grandparents led right into the ongoing debate how to correctly interpret
the Constitution.2"3 The Court recognized and affirmed the long-
standing precedence of parental rights, essentially reflecting common
sense in constitutional law.254 The decision thus "respected the auton-
omy and integrity of the family." 2"
Some scholars disagree with any use of the substantive due process
doctrine, and instead would prefer that the Troxel Court had used
another clause of the Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities Clause.2' According to Professor Amar, the
more infamous origins of substantive due process, such as the Dred Scott
News File.
253. See Marcia Coyle, Do Parents Rights Take Precedence?, NAT'L. L.J., Jan. 17,
2000, at A] 0.
254. Richard W. Garnett, A Victory for the Family, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2000, at A26.
255. Id. Of course, the notion of parental rights as a set of constitutionally protected
fundamental rights has its critics. For example, Professor Garnett expressed himself
more critically of the Troxel decision elsewhere. See Richard W. Garnett, The Supreme
Court Protects Parents' Rights-But at What Cost?, RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES NEWS (E.L.
Wiegand Practice Groups of the Federalist Soc'y, New York, N.Y.), Fall 2000, at 1, 2.
In this newsletter, Garnett attacked the substantive due process line of cases and agreed
with Justice Scalia's rejection of upholding unenumerated rights. Id. However, the
professor also recognized that the present case was not before the Court to challenge
the validity of the existing parental rights jurisprudence. Id at 2-3; see also Sullivan,
supra note 90, at 27.
256. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 122-23 (2000). Notably, Justice Thomas might
agree with a Privileges and Immunities analysis. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80
n.1 (2000).
2001]
UALR LAW REVIEW
case,2 7 and the lack perceived by substantive due process critics of any
textual basis for a constitutional protection of unenumerated rights
under the Due Process Clause could constitute sufficient motivation to
search for other, essentially more legitimate constitutional grounds to
protect certain interests.253 Under such an approach, the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause could serve, by way of
the "doctrinal process of generalization, interpolation, and analogic
reasoning," to protect a "set of fundamental freedoms."" 9 Even though
the Fourteenth Amendment lacks a complete list of all privileges and
immunities, in this reading, it "presupposes" that those rights manifest
themselves elsewhere in documents either formally or informally
ratified by the American people.2" Therefore, any law "utterly outland-
ish," without any support from a broad array of American documents,
could give rise to a judicial declaration that the law is not within the
perimeter of our founders' intent-based on "the wisdom of the
American people more generally," rather than the preferences of
individual Justices. 261
However, the Court has long ago reeled in some of the more
unrestrained and free-wheeling interpretations of unenumerated
fundamental rights.262 Therefore, until the Court definitely departs from
any substantive due process jurisprudence in favor of an alternative
guarantee of fundamental rights-such as the Privileges and Immunities
clause-parental rights cases remain appropriate fundamental rights
precedents. The case of Isabelle and Natalie Troxel, thus, went into the
books as an undeniable reaffirmation of parental rights while also
continuing the Court's more recent efforts to curb the outgrowths of a
perceived out-of-control unenumerated rights jurisprudence.
257. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1851).
258. Amar, supra note 256, at 123.
259. Id Professor Amar names the "freedom of expression and of religion,
protection against unreasonable searches, the safeguards of habeas corpus, and so on."
Id. at 124.
260. Id. The professor lists the Bill of Rights, Magna Carta, the English Petition of
Right, the Declaration of Independence, and state bills of rights. Id.
261. Id
262. Garnett, supra note 254, at 2; e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (overruling previous case law holding unconstitutional minimum wage laws and
expressly questioning the constitutional textual basis for a fundamental right of
contracting). For examples of what today is commonly seen as overreaching judicial
substantive due process analyses, see supra note 130.
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B. Troxel, Forty-Eight Grandparent Visitation State Statutes,
and Arkansas
While this note is not the place to thoroughly examine all forty-
nine remaining grandparent visitation statutes,2"3 a brief glance over
some scholars' statutory discussions appears appropriate. Because the
Court approached the grandparent visitation issue on a case-by-case
basis, other states' grandparent visitation statutes are not necessarily in
danger.2" On the other hand, the Court failed to give the states helpful
instruction when it refused to discuss whether the Due Process Clause
requires a showing of harm.265  Nonetheless, many scholars and
practitioners discussing the potential impact of the Troxel decision on
various state laws find that their third-party visitation statutes probably
would survive challenges.2"
Like the majority of states, no Arkansas appellate court or
commentator has as of yet taken up the validity of the state's grandpar-
ent visitation statute after Troxel.26 Arkansas Code Annotated section
263. The supplement to the Washington Code states that the United States Supreme
Court has found the entire section 26.10.160 unconstitutional in the Troxel case. WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.10.160 (West Supp. 2001).
264. O'Connell, supra note 152, at A20.
265. See Elizabeth Weiss, Comment, Nonparent Visitation Rights v. Family Autonomy:
An Abridgement of Parents' Constitutional Rights?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1085, 1131
(2000).
266. See Shelley L. Albaum, Harold J. Cohn, &' Seth D. Kramer, Parent's
Prerogative: California 's Visitation Statutes May Be Subject to Challenge Under 'Troxel,'
L.A. DAiLY J., July 11, 2000, at 7 (finding that the California visitation statutes are not
overbroad, give significant weight to parental determinations, but may sometimes run
afoul of the Troxel decision as applied); Suzanne Valdez Carey, Grandparent Visitation
Rights in Kansas: A Review ofTroxel v. Granville, J. KAN. B. ASs'N, Oct. 2000, at 14, 17
(finding that the Kansas statute could encounter constitutional problems, but a proper
interpretation and usage of the statute by the state court could save the statute);
Kathleen Donelli & Leanne Murray, The Constitutionality of New York's Grandparent
Visitation Statute in Light of Troxel v. Granville, WESTCHESTER B.J., Spring & Summer
2000, at 19, 24 (finding it possible that New York's grandparent statute fails if state
courts do not give "special weight" to parental reasoning, and calling for a narrower
statutory interpretation); Fern L. Frolin & Jennifer A. Fabriele, After Troxel v.
Granville: Grandparent Visitation in Massachusetts, B. B.J., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 8, 24(recognizing constitutional limits on states' power to grant third party rights to children,
but deeming the Massachusetts grandparent visitation statute safe); David N. Schaffer,
State Law on Grandparent Visitation Needs Revision, CMI. DAILY L. BULL., June 20, 2000,
at 6 (finding that Illinois's grandparent visitation statute may encounter problems until
revised because the statute does not require a substantial relationship between child and
petitioner, gives the court the final say over the best interest of the child, does not give
special weight to parental decisions, has no harm requirement, does not require the
court to put in writing the specific reasons for its decision).
267. However, the 83d General Assembly of Arkansas recently discussed a proposal
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9-13-103 provides that a court can give grandparents and great-
grandparents "reasonable visitation rights" under certain conditions.26
The court must determine whether a grandparent visitation order is in
the best interest of the child.269 While the Arkansas statute lacks
overbroad language such as "any person," the provision does not, at
least on its face, require the court to give special weight to the parents'
determination regarding grandparent visitation. However, the mere fact
that the statute fails to address a potential harm-of-the-child requirement
for visitation may not be dispositive under the Troxel decision, since the
United States Supreme Court refused to rule on the necessity of such a
requirement. Nonetheless, the Arkansas statute could encounter
potentially successful constitutional challenges if a trial judge applies
it in a way that contradicts the Troxel ruling. Whenever an Arkansas
court determines the best interest of the child in a grandparent visitation
proceeding without lending special weight to the parents' point of view,
the circumstances may approach the situation in Troxel too closely for
comfort. Therefore, Arkansas probably would do well to either
judicially narrow the interpretation of the statute, or legislatively revise
the statute.
C. An Open Door for Future Developments
Despite the invalidation of the Washington grandparent visitation
statute, the Troxel decision left the door open for a continued state-
ordered third-party visitation.27 According to some commentators, any
attempt of the United States Supreme Court to finally resolve the
balancing act between grandparental and parental interests, as well as
the child's interests would likely have "crippled the ongoing, if
imperfect, efforts of the states" to find suitable solutions to this
to revise the Arkansas grandparent visitation law, and rejected the revision. Michael R.
Wickline, Senate Panel Balks at Grandparent Visitation Bill, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE,
Apr. 12, 2001, at 9A. House Bill 2303 failed in the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id.
Some representatives detected a judicial uncertainty regarding the current status of the
Arkansas law following the Troxel case. Id. But even if the current Arkansas statute may
be "suspect," the proposed bill went too far in that it would have allowed grandparents
to petition for visitation even in cases where the parents are not divorced or legally
separated. Id.
268. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie Repl. 1998). The statute recognizes as
triggering events for grandparent visitation petitions death of a parent, divorce, legal
separation, or the child being in the care of someone other than a parent, or in certain
cases of illegitimate children. Id.
269. See id. § 9-13-103(2).
270. O'Connell, supra note 152, at A20.
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problem.27' A variety of interest groups applauded the Troxel decision,
albeit for different reasons.272 The American Association of Retired
Persons ("AARP") expressed contentment that the Court had proceeded
cautiously, instead of rashly striking down every grandparent visitation
statute in the country.2" Other groups as diverse as the Christian Right
and womens' rights groups joined the applause.274 Within this chorus of
agreement arose even the voices of such groups as the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund that advocates for lesbian, gay, and other
third-party petitioners such as stepparents and other caregivers.275
Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to express itself
on any of those different perspectives on third-party visitation petitions,
the mere fact that Troxel actually leads to such discussions appears
significant. While apparently few people want serious limits on parental
rights, many have concerns regarding the rights of third parties, as
varying as those concerns may be. Grandparents often raise children,
especially in less fortunate economic and social circumstances. Their
bonds with the children require some protection, if for no other reason
than to safeguard the child's best interest. In addition, the increase in
same-sex partnerships fosters the debate over visitation completely
outside our traditional understanding of familial connections, when only
death or divorce could feasibly result in an unfortunate visitation battle
over children. Perhaps the best feature of the Troxel decision lies indeed
in its limited application and its careful reaffirmation of parental rights.
It appears doubtful that many, if any, state statutes will shipwreck on
the constitutional cliffs of the Troxel case, especially since state
legislatures, as well as state courts, have ample opportunity to amend
or construe their laws if they perceive problems. Given the existing
precedents on parental rights and the Court's careful approach to
substantive due process analysis, it appears that Troxel was the right
decision, even though it failed, quite naturally, to satisfy everybody.
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